


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1 June 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF



*Dominican Republic: The government of puppet President Balaguer was apparently still in power on 1 June following the assassination late on 30 May of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic for the past 31 years. The assassination was apparently carried out by a group headed by retired army general, Juan Tomas Diaz, who has been in close contact with a pro-US, middle-of-the-road dissident civilian group. The longer the plotters delay in following up the assassination with a move to seize power, the greater the chances of a power struggle among military and civilian groups. Such an internal power struggle, if protracted, would enhance the opportunities of pro-Castro elements, both inside the country and in exile. During the past ten months pro-Castro groups inside the country have been strengthened by the dictator's own political machinations. Last week a high dissident source told the American Consulate that the officers involved in the plot hoped the US would have military strength available in the area in case a post-Trujillo government asks for assistance in controlling the internal situation.

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General Diaz is reported to be in hiding in the interior as the police and units of the Dominican armed forces round up individuals believed to have been associated with him.


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The move to seize power that was to follow the assassination may have been frustrated, at least for the time being. Meanwhile, the late dictator's two sons have arrived in the Dominican Republic after

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
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a hastily arranged charter flight from Europe. [redacted] 25X1
Rafael "Ramfis" Trujillo, Jr., is a general and a minister without portfolio and is believed, with his military associates, to have a core of fanatical support in the Air Force mobile infantry unit stationed near Ciudad Trujillo. This military unit, roughly equivalent to a US World War II regimental combat team, is likely to play an important part in any developing struggle for power. Also the two army brigades stationed in the capital city are commanded by relatives of the late dictator. The clique around "Ramfis" includes the de facto head of the hated Military Intelligence Service, John Abbes, who has been involved since 1957 in Trujillo's subversive operations in other Latin American countries. It also includes officials of Radio Caribe, whose pro-Castro and bitterly anti-US and anti-clerical diatribes over the past ten months have probably contributed to at least some degree of anti-US feeling among the Dominican people.

The NBC correspondent in Ciudad Trujillo reported late on 31 May that the capital city was quiet. [redacted]

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
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[] Congo: [Foreign Minister Spaak of Belgium has informed Ambassador MacArthur that reports of unrest and anxiety among the Belgians in Katanga have aroused misgivings within the Belgium Government and furnished certain elements, presumably economic groups in Brussels with investments in the Congo, with ammunition to oppose his policies. Spaak emphasized that while he is prepared to withdraw Belgian military personnel as soon as possible from Katanga, there must be UN replacements acceptable to Katanga and with the capability of maintaining order. He indicated that a mass withdrawal of Belgian civilians and technicians might otherwise occur. If such a withdrawal occurred it would result in economic chaos in Katanga.] no

President Kasavubu's ideas on the reconvening of parliament in the Congo differ notably from Hammarskjold's. In contrast to Kasavubu, who appears willing to seek an accommodation with Katanga but not with Stanleyville, Hammarskjold has publicly stated that a meeting of parliament without representatives of both the Leopoldville and the Stanleyville governments "would not make sense." He added that the UN-controlled Kamina base in Katanga--the site desired by Gizenga for any meeting of parliament--would be a practical site.

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Iceland. The strikes which began in Iceland on 29 May remain confined largely to a number of Communist unions representing about one fourth of the approximately 30,000 members of the Communist-dominated Central Labor Federation. The Conservative - Social Democratic government apparently is holding firm in its determination not to permit wage increases which might undercut its economic stabilization program. A compromise wage proposal reportedly is being prepared by the state mediator for presentation to the workers on 3 June. Thus far, the operations of the US-manned NATO base at Keflavik have not been affected, although the Reykjavik waterfront is described as at a "standstill." [redacted]

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[redacted] 25X1

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

A. No change from last week.

B. No change from last week.

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D. [SOUTH KOREA: The situation remains unstable in South Korea, and the military command relationships with CINCUNC are still untested. We have seen no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation.] *no*

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[IRAN: The future of the Amini government, which is under pressure from left and right, faced with economic difficulties and possible labor unrest, and with the Shah not reconciled to any long-term relinquishment of his powers, seems uncertain at this time. The USSR, which has intensified its clandestine propaganda directed against the regime, may take advantage of this situation by beginning new diplomatic efforts to sever Iran's defense relationships with the West and will attempt to capitalize on any major unrest.]

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION

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[The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 9 through 29 May 1961:] *no*

[1. Khrushchev stated to Ambassador Thompson on 23 May that he considers Berlin the main topic for discussion at Vienna. We do not feel, however, that he is setting the stage for a showdown]

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{with the President. Khrushchev's interest in negotiating a settlement is still evident. Nevertheless, in his conversation with Ambassador Thompson and in a similar talk with the West German ambassador last month Khrushchev implied a deadline of late 1961 or early 1962 for a final Soviet decision whether to go ahead with a separate treaty. However, he has been careful to avoid committing Soviet prestige to an exact schedule in public.}

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{2. Khrushchev maintained his position that the USSR will sign a peace treaty with East Germany and transfer control over allied military access if no agreement can be reached. Khrushchev repeatedly emphasized his previous contention that as a consequence of a separate treaty, the West will not have free access without coming to terms with the East German regime.}

{3. The timing of the 23 May conversation was intended to make early negotiations an attractive alternative to the threatened conclusion of a separate peace treaty. Khrushchev's statements to Ambassador Thompson provide further evidence that Moscow intends to concentrate on obtaining Western agreement to an interim solution for Berlin. The ideas of a new summit meeting and further high-level negotiations have begun to appear in the Soviet propaganda build-up for the Vienna talks, and we expect that these themes will become more prominent.}

{4. While Khrushchev's remarks undoubtedly serve the Soviet Premier's tactical purposes in preparing for his talks with the President, they also point up his basic dilemma. On the one hand, Khrushchev's long-standing and repeated commitments to sign a separate treaty if he fails to obtain satisfaction from the West probably act as a form of pressure on the Soviet leader. On the other hand, despite Khrushchev's}

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{repeated expressions of skepticism regarding the West's willingness to resort to war over Berlin, his actions during the past two and one-half years suggest that he is not sufficiently certain what the Western response in a crisis would be and that he still prefers a negotiated solution.)

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The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

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The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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